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Abstract
In two decades of scholarship on hybrid regimes two significant advancements have been made. First, scholars have em-
phasized that the hybrid regimes that emerged in the post-Cold War era should not be treated as diminished sub-types
of democracy, and second, regime type is a multi-dimensional concept. This review essay further contends that losing
the lexicon of hybridity and focusing on a single dimension of regime type—flawed electoral competition—has prevented
an examination of extra-electoral factors that are necessary for understanding how regimes are differently hybrid, why
there is such immense variation in the outcome of elections and why these regimes are constantly in flux. Therefore, a
key recommendation emerging from this review of the scholarship is that to achieve a more thorough, multi-dimensional
assessment of hybrid regimes, further research ought to be driven by nested research designs in which qualitative and
quantitative approaches can be used to advance mid-range theory building.
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1. Introduction
As the Third Wave of Democracy ended in the 1990s, a
plethora of regimes emerged in the non-western world
that were qualitatively different from each other, but
also from Western democracies. These were hybrid
regimes that occupied the “grey zone” between liberal
democracies on the one hand and closed authoritarian
regimes on the other (Carothers, 2002). The main chal-
lenge that scholars of comparative politics faced was
how to define and classify these hybrid regimes without
falling prey to concept stretching. This spawned a vast
literature, which attempted to unpack this category of
regimes. Nearly twodecades later it is important to evalu-
ate how this research agenda has evolved and if we have
enhanced our understanding of this regime type.
Early work on hybrid regimes focused on conceptu-
alizing these regimes because it was necessary to dis-
tinguish the boundaries among different regime types—
authoritarian, hybrid and democracy (Merkel, 2004;
Puhle, 2005). Scholars have since then established that
hybrid regimes should try to avoid the teleological bias
of earlier studies that categorized hybrid regimes as di-
minished sub-types of either democracy or authoritari-
anism (Bogaards, 2009; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Mor-
lino, 2009). We have now also learnt that hybrid regimes
are not transitional phases but in fact political regimes
that manifest a combination of both authoritarian and
democratic tendencies that ought to be examined in
comparison to each other and not against the standards
of democracy.
A thriving set of literature that treats hybrid regimes
as being a sub-type of authoritarianism due to flawed
electoral competition (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler,
2002, 2006) tends to examine these regimes along
only one dimension of electoral competitiveness. This
review makes the case that if we are to understand
the political consequences of elections on regime type,
it is imperative to treat hybrid regimes as multi-
dimensional concepts. However, to conduct meaningful
multi-dimensional analysis, this article proposes nested
research designs that entail both qualitative and quanti-
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tative approaches. Qualitative research should be driven
by single-n case studies, or paired comparisons based
on in-depth field research with the intention to ad-
vance our contextual knowledge of these regimes and
facilitate mid-range theory-building. This qualitative ap-
proach should be complemented by large-n statistical
analysis that tests the strength of the independent vari-
able gleaned from the case study.
This article proceeds in the following way: section 2
sheds light on the conceptual confusion that has per-
sisted among scholars over the question, what are hybrid
regimes and makes the case that these regimes are not
transitional states. The next section examines the impor-
tance of treating regime type as amulti-dimensional con-
cept. Section 4 suggests ways to advance causal research
on hybrid regimes.
2. What Are Hybrid Regimes?
Despite the extensive theorization of hybrid regimes and
numerous attempts to bring some clarity to the blurred
lines among different political regimes, it is difficult to
find consensus among scholars overwhat hybrid regimes
actually are. This unfortunately has hampered the “accu-
mulation of knowledge” on what a hybrid regime is (Cas-
sani, 2014, p. 548). The inconsistency in the variety of
approaches used to define hybrid regimes is proof that
scholars are not in conversation with each other or build-
ing on each other’s work to advance the research agenda.
Hybrid regimes are variably understood as dimin-
ished subtypes of democracy (Merkel, 2004; Puhle, 2005;
Zakaria, 1997); diminished subtypes of authoritarian-
ism (Schedler, 2006); transitional “situations” that are
expected to revert back to either democracy or au-
thoritarianism (Armony & Schamis, 2005; Linz, 1973);
a residual category of regimes that fit neither democ-
racy nor authoritarianism (Bogaards, 2009; Gilbert &
Mohseni, 2011); or as clear-cut instances of authoritar-
ianism (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011; Gandhi, 2008).
2.1. Diminished Subtypes
A diminished subtype stems from a root concept, where
the attributes of the latter are not fully shared by the
former (Collier & Mahon, 1993, p. 848). If we can visu-
alize hybrid regimes to comprise the “sprawling middle
of a political continuum between democracy and non-
democracy” (Bunce & Wolchik, 2008), the graded na-
ture of the spectrum sees “democracy as an institutional
quality that is principally a matter of degree” (Wahman,
Teorell, & Hadenius, 2013, p. 21). It follows therefore
that as one moves away from the democratic end of the
spectrum essential qualities of the regime are lost, mak-
ing the democratic regime a diminished version of itself.
This led scholars to proliferate typologies of democracy,
a trend described as “democracy with adjectives” (Col-
lier & Levitsky, 1997) or the “terminological babel of de-
mocratization studies” (Armony& Schamis, 2005, p. 113).
Some of themost popular terms were delegative democ-
racy (O’Donnell, 1994), semi-democracy (Diamond, Linz,
& Lipset, 1995), illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997), and
pseudo-democracy (Diamond, 2002). Most recently, Ger-
man scholars like W. Merkel, (2004) built on the concept
of defective democracy or incomplete democracy. The
central pre-occupation of these scholars was to under-
stand why these diminished forms (or hybrid regimes)
were unable to transition to democracy because, as Linz
(2000, p. 34) points out, there was a hope that these im-
perfect democracies would amend themselves.
On the other end of the spectrum, scholars of au-
thoritarianism have also been complicit in viewing hy-
brid regimes as a “corruption of the preceding regime”
(Morlino, 2009, p. 280). The only redeeming merit ac-
cording to A. Cassani (2014, p. 544) was that these
scholars “stressed the attributes that these regimes
possessed than what they lacked”. M. Ottaway (2003)
coined the term semi-authoritarianism to describe a
regime that displayed characteristics of both democracy
and authoritarianism—these were not failed democra-
cies, but regimes that wanted to maintain their ambigu-
ous character. The co-existence of elections as the pre-
dominant form of elite succession and dictatorial control
led A. Schedler (2002, p. 36) to identify electoral authori-
tarianism—aregime inwhich leaders “hold elections and
tolerate some pluralism and interparty competition but
violate democratic norms so severely and systematically
that it makes no sense to call them democracies, how-
ever qualified”. The distinguishing feature of multi-party
elections with the absence of democracy led to an even
more precise typology including the hegemonic electoral
authoritarian regimes (see Magaloni, 2006, on Mexico),
in which the leader’s party routinely wins; competitive
authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002), in which oppo-
sition parties can win substantial majorities in elections;
or the closed authoritarian regime, where no opposition
parties are allowed to exist.
The implication of defining hybrid regimes as dimin-
ished subtypes of either democracy or authoritarianism
was that empirical researchwould be extremely challeng-
ing because the boundaries between the mixed regimes
and their root concept were blurred (Bogaards, 2009).
Furthermore, the definition of a hybrid regime would
vary depending on how scholars understood the root
concept. His solution to this problem was a double-root
strategy in which the “root concepts are defined in rela-
tion to each other and cases are classified with a view to
both” (2009, p. 410). As a result, Bogaards argued that
hybrid regimes ought to be conceived as a residual cat-
egory that fits neither democracy nor authoritarianism
but as a regime type unto itself.
2.2. A Residual Category
The proposal to treat hybrid regimes as a residual cate-
gory and to study them on their own terms instead of
being anchored to either democracy or authoritarianism
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resulted in the proposal of fresh typologies that have at-
tempted to advance the comparative analysis of political
regimes (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Wigell, 2008). Schol-
ars also attempted to create intermediate types between
democracy and authoritarianism. For example, the tri-
chotomous scheme advocated by Mainwaring, Brinks
and Perez-Linan (2001) organized regimes into democ-
racy, semi-democracy and authoritarianism. Other labels
for this intermediate regime type includedmixed (Bunce
& Wolchik, 2008) or simply hybrid (Ekman, 2009; Karl,
1995). Although this approach allowed for greater dif-
ferentiation, its analytical utility is limited. The regimes
that fit this residual category are so qualitatively differ-
ent from each other that except for the one commonal-
ity that they are neither democratic nor authoritarian, it
is very hard to actually compare them systematically.
2.3. An Authoritarian Regime
Those who favor a more dichotomous approach to cat-
egorization treat hybrid regimes as overt instances of
authoritarianism. For these scholars there is no overlap
between regime types. This allows for more parsimo-
nious categorization by creating mutually exclusive cat-
egories that classify regimes as being democratic or au-
thoritarian (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010; Sartori,
1987). The presence of political institutions that have
been integral to democratization in the West contribute
to the hybridity of the regime, such as political parties
(Gandhi, 2008; Greene, 2009;Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010);
elections (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009)
and the legislature (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Malesky
& Schuler, 2010). However, Cassani (2014) notes that
these scholars downplay the mixed nature of the regime,
because the presence of democratic institutions does
not fundamentally alter the identity of the authoritarian
regime itself.
Another way to conceptualize the hybrid regime is to
categorize it as an authoritarian sub-type, a trend that
is suggested by B. Magaloni’s (2006) hegemonic party
regime or the limited multi-party regime (Hadenius &
Teorell, 2007) which corresponds to Schedler’s concep-
tion of the electoral authoritarian regime.
2.4. A “Transitional Situation”
Partly the reason for why there is a conceptual diver-
gence among scholars on how seriously to view hybrid
regimes as a regime type, and not in relation to other
regimes is due to the inherent instability stemming from
the ruling elite competing over the resources of the state
and the effort expended to implement policies aimed at
their self-preservation. The fluid nature of politics is as-
sumed to be symptomatic of the regime being in a tran-
sitional “situation”, suggesting that the transition will ei-
ther be completed once democracy consolidates or the
regime could backslide and renew forms of autocratic
control (Armony & Schamis, 2005). But there is also a
third possibility, where a regime could stabilize in this
uncertain state and persist as a hybrid regime. This is be-
cause the coalition of individual or collective actors that
maintain the regime can use the ambiguity of the regime
to achieve their preferred political goals and, therefore,
do not have the incentive to aim for an ideal regime type.
Morlino (2009) argues that if the co-existence of author-
itarian and democratic features continues to persist for
more than ten years, then one can plausibly argue that
the main actors in the regime have found an adequate
means for their perpetuation, or that a central power
keeps the regime in its characteristic “state of ambiguity
and uncertainty” (p. 286).
This section has shown that although the conceptu-
alization of hybrid regimes led to a vast literature, un-
fortunately confusion over what hybrid regimes are still
lingers. The disagreement on whether hybrid regimes
are diminished subtypes, residual category, transitional
phase or an outright case of authoritarianism has im-
portant implications for empirical work. Cassani’s anal-
ysis of eight studies that attempt to identify political
regimes found that they disagreed on which regimes
to call hybrid (2014). Morse (2012) also observes that
there is significant divergence among scholars studying
the phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism in that
there is no consensus over the extent of electoral viola-
tions that would make a regime non-democratic. For ex-
ample, Egypt and Singapore, which do not have competi-
tive electionswould be considered authoritarian by Levit-
sky andWay (2010), yet Schedlerwould deem them to be
electoral authoritarian and therefore hybrid. The selec-
tion bias stemming from this conceptual divergence can
make it difficult to evaluate causal research. Moreover,
the misidentification of regime type can have impor-
tant policy implications for those in the field of democ-
racy promotion.
The conceptual confusion over what constitutes a hy-
brid regime has also led scholars to move away from
the lexicon of hybridity towards either electoral democ-
racy (Diamond, 2002) or electoral authoritarian regimes
(Lindberg, 2009; Schedler, 2006), with a greater empiri-
cal focus on dimensions or components of these regimes
through continuous measures suing databases such as V-
Dem, Polity IV, FreedomHouse, etc. This shift has encour-
aged the recognition of how regimes may be “differently
democratic” or “differently authoritarian” or even “dif-
ferently hybrid”.
However, I would urge caution before we discard the
term “hybrid” for two reasons: first, political regimes are
not inherently stable. Therefore, we need to move be-
yond the teleological assumptions embedded in the “di-
minished subtypes” approaches. Contemporary politics
shows that democracy itselfmay not be a stable category.
After the election of Trump in the United States, follow-
ing the election of similar leaders in established democra-
cies like Hungary, Poland and Venezuela, not to mention
less established democracies such as Russia and Turkey,
there is increasing concern over democratic backslid-
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 112–119 114
ing. Democracies themselves can be “diminished” (see
Mounk, 2016, 2018), which challenges the need to mea-
sure “hybrid” against stable categories of democracy or
dictatorship. Perhaps hybrid is the norm?
Second, hybrid regimes are also not a transitional
state that is expected to quickly amend itself and be-
come either a democracy or an authoritarian regime. In
fact, what we have found is that hybrid regimes are often
quite durable and need to be understood for what they
truly are and that the terminology used to refer to such
regimes should reflect this.
3. The Importance of Multi-Dimensionality
The most common underlying dimension for classifying
regimes is electoral competition (Howard & Roessler,
2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Lindberg, 2009; Schedler,
2006). However, hinging the classification of hybrid
regimes on the basis of electoral competition on a uni-
dimensional spectrum anchored by liberal democracy on
the one end, and closed authoritarianism on the other,
can prove to be problematic. L. Morgenbesser (2014) ex-
plains that the role of elections in democracies, and the
meaning attached to them, is not the same as in an au-
thoritarian regime (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). In the for-
mer, the assumption is that elections are a democratic
institution for the purposes of legitimate elite succession.
But elections in authoritarian regimes can also serve as
instruments of elite-management, distribution of patron-
age and signaling legitimacy in non-democratic regimes
(Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni,
2006). For Morgenbesser (2014) this has resulted in con-
cept stretching because analysts have failed to recognize
that the role performed by elections—an institution that
makes the regime hybrid—will vary depending on the
root concept used and also the political context. Regime
analysts only pay attention to the “quality” elections for
regime analysts and not to “quality andmeaning” (p. 25).
The overwhelming emphasis on elections also over-
looks a range of more fundamental dimensions that are
critical to the analysis of political regimes. It ignores the
reality that hybrid regimes can be different from each
other ways besides the competitiveness of an election.
Munck and Snyder (2004) explain that the political con-
sequences of elections depend on interaction with key
extra-electoral factors, such as who rules, how do they
rule,why do they rule and how much do they rule. These
are all factors that Morse refers to as “actor capacity”
(2012, p. 173).
Similarly, Gilbert andMohseni (2011) have also found
that by redefining of the electoral regime they dis-
covered additional regimedimensions—competitiveness
and competition—that are important for classification.
They explain that “democracies are competitive regimes
with fair competition, whereas authoritarian regimes
are uncompetitive regimes with unfair competitions.
Hybrid regimes occupy the conceptual void of com-
petitive regimes with unfair competition” (Gilbert &
Mohseni, 2011, p. 280). While competitiveness is cru-
cial for distinguishing democratic and hybrid regimes
from authoritarian ones, only the quality of competition
is operationalized in distinguishing democracies from
non-democracies (including authoritarian and hybrid
regimes). Beyond elections, another key element that
establishes this boundary between democracy and non-
democracies is tutelary interference, when unelected
bodies such as the military, religious authorities or a
monarch constrain the agency of elected leaders or veto
national legislation.
Multi-dimensional conceptualizations of regime
types are not new to political science. For example,
R. Dahl (1971) dropped the use of the word democracy
and introduced polyarchy—a regime type defined by
the intersection of two dimensions, contestation (the
right to compete over desired policies) and participa-
tion (the freedom to participate in the political process).
Merkel (2004) emphasized three dimensions of democ-
racy including vertical legitimacy, horizontal account-
ability plus rule of law and effective government. These
dimensions were further broken down into sub-criteria,
which, if violated, would result in four types of defective
democracy—exclusive, illiberal, delegative, and tutelary
democracy. Inspired by Merkel, Wigell (2008) also starts
with the root concept liberal democracy, emphasizing
that the goal of democracy is popular government, and
the goal of liberalism is limited government, leading to
the construction of a typology along two dimensions—
electoralism and constitutionalism. Yet the problem he
faced is that by assuming that flawed elections and the
absence of rule of law are the only ways a regime can
be hybrid, he misses out on cases like Pakistan, that are
in fact hybrid due to the presence of reserved domains
of power (Adeney, 2015). This is why he is compelled to
add additional attributes to his minimal criteria of elec-
toralism and constitutionalism. Although, these studies
make valiant efforts to move beyond the simplistic uni-
dimensional conceptions of hybrid regimes, they still
retain the tendency to view regimes through the “prism
of democracy” (Munck & Snyder, 2004, p. 1) and are
therefore limited in grasping the full range of variation
in regime type globally.
The greatest stride made in regime classification has
been made by L. Gilbert & P. Mohseni (2011) who pro-
posed a multi-dimensional conception of hybridity utiliz-
ing a configurative approach (Geddes, 1999; Linz, 2000)
for the categorization of hybrid regimes. This approach is
particularly suitable because it can capture the complex-
ity posed by hybrid regimes, by combining multiple at-
tributes (competitiveness, tutelary interference and civil
liberties) as the defining characteristics of the regime.
These dimensions cannot be combined to form a single
continuum. Each attribute is viewed dichotomously be-
cause it emphasizes “differences in kind rather than de-
gree” (p. 282). Gilbert & Mohseni advocate strongly for
this approach for three reasons: First, because it enables
the comparison or measurement of hybrid regimes in re-
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lation to other regime types. Second, it allows regimes
to be hybrid not just because of flawed competition but
may be due to other factors such as the presence of re-
served domains of power. Third, in comparison to other
typologies of hybrid regimes, the configurative approach
provides the most comprehensive list of hybrid regimes
that have existed from 1990–2009, grouped under the
categories of illiberal hybrid regime, tutelary illiberal hy-
brid regime and tutelary liberal hybrid regime. As noted
by Gilbert & Mohseni (2011), their three-dimensional
categorization shows which countries can be grouped
together to facilitate comparison and advance the re-
search agenda.
The configurative approach to regime classification
that pays heed to multi-dimensionality is a complex cat-
egorization, but that is also the reason for its complete-
ness. The challenge of gainfully adopting this approach
is that one needs to understand the unique political con-
text of each case before categorizing it, thereby requiring
scholars to undertake in-depth single-n case studies. An
excellent example is K. Adeney’s analysis of Pakistan’s hy-
brid regime (2015). She argues that Pakistan has mean-
ingful, multi-party elections, increasing civil autonomy
from the tutelary control of the military compared to
the 1990s or early 2000s because of which there would
be temptation to view Pakistan as a transitional democ-
racy. However, Pakistan ranks very low on civil liberties
and the indirect intervention by the military in politics
and foreign policy make it a hybrid regime. By acknowl-
edging regime heterogeneity, and scoring Pakistan’s hy-
brid regime on a three-dimensional continuum, Adeney
demonstrates the utility of the configurative approach,
which is to pinpoint precisely what factors are prevent-
ing Pakistan from crossing the threshold of democracy.
4. Advancing Causal Research
To recap, two decades of scholarship on hybrid regimes
has advanced our understanding of political regimes in
two important ways. First, it is unfruitful to make the
teleological assumption that the hybrid regimes that
emerged in the post-Cold War era as being diminished
sub-types of democracy or authoritarianism, which an-
chor the grey zone that these regimes occupied. Fur-
ther, it is unrealistic to expect these regimes to necessar-
ily democratize as liberalization occurred and elections
were held.
Yet, the response to this lesson has been to view
hybrid regimes as a type of authoritarian regime, ad-
vanced by Schedler’s conception of the electoral author-
itarianism. This has been an important conceptual shift
for two reasons. First, scholars have begun to study hy-
brid regimes relative to one another instead of examin-
ing how they fall short of meeting the prerequisites of
a democracy. Second, instead of democratization, the
central occupation of scholars is to understand author-
itarian durability and to consider factors that perpetuate
hybridity or catalyze democratization. However, an over-
emphasis on only a single dimension of regime type—
electoral competition—has prevented an examination of
extra-electoral factors that are necessary for understand-
ing how regimes are differently hybrid or why there is
such immense variation in the outcome of elections.
Therefore, the second lesson learnt from the hybrid
regimes literature is to adopt multi-dimensional assess-
ment of regimes, as showcased by Gilbert andMohsenis’
refreshing hybrid regime classification described in sec-
tion 3. However, complex, multi-dimensional categoriza-
tions necessitate that further research on hybrid regimes
ought to be driven by single-n case studies, or paired
comparisons based on in-depth field research with the
intention to advance our contextual knowledge of these
regimes and facilitate midrange theory-building.
Practically, the challenge of a single-n, case-driven re-
search design is one of access and observation. The in-
stitutions and norms of such regimes are dismissed as
being unstable and therefore difficult to examine (Loyle,
2016). Often hybrid regimes are unsafe and politically-
charged environments, where research travel is viewed
as suspicious activity, and getting access to political elite
and authentic evidence very difficult. Methodologically,
the challenge is best described by Morse (2012, p. 163):
“research cannot be too distant from actual cases, lead-
ing to conceptual ambiguity, nor too close to specific
cases, thus failing to generate comparative leverage”. It is
not enough to just undertake the configurative approach,
populate it with country cases, perhaps also with quan-
titative indicators because this will only tell us about
how politics really works in Malaysia, Egypt, Singapore
or elsewhere. It is necessary for the knowledge gleaned
from the individual cases to help bridge research agen-
das and generate new avenues for causal research. Per-
haps one way to do this is to adopt a nested research
design (see Howard & Roessler, 2006, p. 366), which in-
cludes both “quantitative and qualitative methods, with
the goal of providing a more valid, reliable, and power-
ful causal explanation than could be achieved with ei-
ther method alone”. They use large-n statistical analysis
to test the strength of their independent variable, and
follow-up with a single-n case study to demonstrate how
the independent variable matters.
Since this article advocates a multi-dimensional ap-
proach, the remaining task is to make a case and provide
the rationale for a dimension that is often under-studied
in hybrid regimes—elite recruitment and selection. In hy-
brid regimes that are manifestly multi-party systems, in-
vestigating the recruitment of the party elite to elected
public office is relevant to understanding the distribution
of power among the coalition of collective and individ-
ual actors who are decisive in maintaining the regime. In
other hybrid regimes, we should leverage existing knowl-
edge on non-democratic regimes to identify the relevant
political elite, which would be the selectorate (military
junta, political party, family/tribe) and the ruler (mili-
tary dictator, civilian ruler or monarch). I argue that the
question of political recruitment and selection is impor-
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tant because it determines who gains power, it empow-
ers the recruiters and defines the relationship between
the rulers and the ruled by guiding and affecting the be-
haviour of the political leadership.
There are two reasons for choosing this dimension
over all others: First, the definition of a regime entails
both behavioural and institutional dimensions, because
of which examining the actions of political actors is in-
tegral to the understanding of a regime. S.-E. Skaaning’s
definition of a political regime highlights precisely why
elite recruitment and selection matters to an analysis of
regime type. A political regime is the “institutionalized
set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying
the power holders (character of the possessor(s) of ulti-
mate decisional sovereignty) and it also regulates the ap-
pointments to main political posts (extension and char-
acter of political rights) as well as the vertical limitations
(extension and character of civil liberties) and horizontal
limitations on the exercise of political power (extension
and character of division of powers―control and auton-
omy)” (2006, p. 15).
This definition is relevant for the ensuing discussion
for three reasons: 1) It accepts that institutions are an
important contextual factor shaping and limiting the ac-
tions of political actors, while simultaneously acknowl-
edging that the institutional setting is often constructed
by the actors themselves. 2) This definition acknowl-
edges that very often the rules and procedures defin-
ing a regime may not always be formal and officially-
sanctioned, which behoves scholars to also examine the
informal aspects of how power is distributed in society.
3) This definition does not just focus on the relationship
between the rulers and the ruled (vertical limitations),
but also the relationships thatmight exist among the vari-
ous power-holders (horizontal limitations). The latter set
of relationships entail a constant renegotiation among
elites that may cause shifts in the balance of power un-
derpinning a regime.
Political elites and their capacity to perpetuate them-
selves in positions of power determines the nature of the
regime. Examining recruitment and selection of the polit-
ical elite entails examining not just the resources (time,
money, support networks) available to these actors, but
also theirmotivations to pursue political careers and how
much autonomy they have in these positions. This is par-
ticularly crucial inmaking this dimension amore superior
one because, although Gilbert and Mohseni’s dimension
of tutelary influence captures the freedom with which
leaders can rule, it does not take into account the incen-
tive structures confronting political actors and explain
their motivations.
Second, examining recruitment and selection pro-
vides a replicable and valid framework that can make
comparative analysis of hybrid regimes possible. Any
study of political recruitment takes for granted that the
elite seek to perpetuate themselves, their goals, and
their policies. In authoritarian regimes elites maintain
themselves through arbitrary decisions that do not need
to be justified ideologically as we might expect in demo-
cratic regimes, where multiple elites compete for con-
trol over policymaking processes by mobilizing and seek-
ing support from the electorate. The political elite are
interested in having a hand in their own succession be-
cause as policymakers they also have a stake in the future.
A regime is held together at the foundations by stable
coalitions of interests made possible by consistent poli-
cies. As policies are made by the elite, the perpetuation
of the latter is a prerequisite for regime maintenance.
Methods of elite recruitment and succession therefore
partly define the nature of the regime. When elites are
willing to expose themselves to electoral competition
and are willing to let citizens determine “who shall rule”
in a free election, the regime can be defined as demo-
cratic (Huntington, 1996; Schumpeter, 1950). However,
when opposite conditions prevail, the regime must be
defined as oligarchic at best or authoritarian at worst. If
one treats elite recruitment as the independent variable
explaining political regimes, the strategies employed by
the elite to access power and perpetuate themselves in
power is worth exploring (Eulau & Czudonowski, 1976).
5. Looking Ahead
The suggestions made in this article with respect to ad-
vancing the research agenda on hybrid regimes are cer-
tainly not exhaustive. My suggestion to examine the di-
mension of recruitment and selection is by no means
the only dimension worth exploring, although I would
argue it is a robust, valid and replicable starting point.
However, more research on other important dimensions
of political regimes must also be undertaken. For exam-
ple, J. Ekman (2009), instead of focusing on horizontal ac-
countability among political elites, examines vertical ac-
countability between the ruler and ruled. He measures
the participation of citizens using three variables: confi-
dence in political parties, turnout and confidence in elec-
tions and public support for democracy. Another avenue
of research would be to reflect on hybrid regimes in their
international context (see Tansey, 2013), in relation to
democracy promotion, authoritarian diffusion and vari-
ous forms of globalization. Thus far, patterns of continu-
ity and change in hybrid regimes have only been studied
domestically and have not taken into account the influ-
ence of global politics.
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